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The Schlegelians v. the Langdellians  
on Legal Education 
Robert W. Gordon† 
In great dramas there’s a moment when a character 
shows up who makes such an impression that, whatever else 
may be going on, you just wait for that character to reappear. 
Sir John Falstaff makes his entrance in the second scene of 
Henry IV, Part I, and from that point on has the audience 
wanting to skip over all the ponderous high statecraft of 
kings and nobles so we can all get back to Jack Falstaff. Jack 
Schlegel, in my recollection, made his entrance in my second 
year at Buffalo in the Fall of 1973. Once you hear that voice, 
with its almost-whispered, shockingly original and 
penetrating aperçus, followed by the cackling laugh that tells 
you that you and he, and anyone else who may be around, 
are just having the grandest possible time together, you want 
more. A year later Schlegel and I, along with Al Katz and 
Janet Lindgren, formed “Section 3,” an experimental section 
of the first-year that combined Torts and Contracts, made 
Procedure auxiliary to both, and set the class to practical 
tasks like drafting pleadings, arguing motions, taking 
depositions, negotiating contracts. The enterprise took a 
good deal of planning, most of which took place in one 
another’s homes, accompanied by many bottles of wine and, 
 
†Professor of Law, Stanford University; Chancellor Kent Professor of Law & 
Legal History, Emeritus, Yale University.  
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when we were lucky, Joanne playing the piano. Our 
students, surprisingly (for law students) open to unorthodox 
experiments, indulged us with amazing good humor. I think 
this may have been the most intense and exciting intellectual 
experience of my professional life; and Schlegel was essential 
to it.1  
It was in that period that he began the research for his 
seminal book on American Legal Realism and Empirical 
Social Science (1995).2 Looking back, I see that he and I were 
animated by the same questions, which derived from the 
disappointments of our own legal educations, and could be 
boiled down to, “given the great ferment of 20th Century 
thought, why has so much American legal scholarship been 
so unadventurous and uninteresting?” We were motivated to 
look at some of the exceptions, the adventurous anomalies—
in my case, socio-legal historians like Willard Hurst, in his, 
the Legal Realists—in part to try to explain why their work 
was treated as weird and eccentric and failed to catch on. 
Schlegel noticed that Legal Realism was conventionally 
treated as a school of jurisprudence, a theory about how 
courts decided cases, and an amateur and perhaps 
perniciously relativistic jurisprudence at that; and that this 
treatment bypassed a large body of work the Realists did 
trying to make good on their promise to integrate law and 
social science, to study the law “in action,” in its “social 
context.” In the process he rescued a whole tradition of 
empirical work from obscurity and some important scholars, 
like Underhill Moore, from undeserved neglect and ridicule. 
The enterprise was, he concluded, mostly abandoned for 
 
 1. I left Buffalo in 1977, but Schlegel has remained a loyal and devoted 
friend, not just to me, but to my entire family. We see each other at conferences, 
and correspond when the mood strikes. He has been an acute and generous 
reader and editor of my work over the years. When my daughter spent a summer 
in Buffalo a few years ago, Jack and Joanne looked out for her. Schlegel also 
corresponded regularly with my ex-wife Martha until her death last February; 
came to her memorial meeting; and wrote a moving tribute for the occasion. 
 2. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE (1995).  
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largely contingent reasons (the Depression killed off research 
funding, many of the principals went off to join the New Deal, 
others got bored with the inconclusiveness of empirical work, 
etc.). The book remains today a landmark, one of the most 
impressive works of intellectual history in law or any other 
field.  
The question we started with (“Why . . . so 
uninteresting?) has stayed with him. In the last few weeks 
I’ve been reading Schlegel’s output on the history and 
present condition of legal education. There is a lot of it—in 
addition to the book, some fifty-two essays and reviews in the 
HeinOnline database, which include delicious 
improvisational riffs alongside many richly footnoted 
articles. Among his many other concerns, Schlegel wants to 
explain how C.C. Langdell’s Harvard Law School experiment 
of the 1870s and 80s ultimately became the template for legal 
education in the entire country, adopted even by schools 
preparing students for very different practice jobs than those 
of the big-city law firms. There was nothing inevitable about 
its triumph. From the start the model ran into resistance, 
and had many rivals: the night schools that actually 
educated most lawyers until their demise in the Great 
Depression and World War II; Columbia’s blending of Law 
and Political Science;3 or Ernst Freund’s University of 
Chicago, which offered courses in Legislation, 
Administrative Law, Relation of State to Industry, Labor 
and Capital, and Railroad Regulation;4 John Norton 
Pomeroy’s Hastings curriculum combining legal theory with 
history and political science to supply a theoretical 
foundation in the first year, and using the third year for 
practical exercises such as trial preparation and drafting 
documents;5 Woodrow Wilson’s projected (but never built) 
 
 3. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 85–89, 95–97, 67–68 (1955). 
 4. See Paul Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 467, 491–92 (1994). 
 5. See THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST 
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law school at Princeton, also combining private law with 
public law, history, and political science;6 Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld’s fantastically ambitious proposal for a School of 
Jurisprudence;7 or John Henry Wigmore’s construction of an 
ideal curriculum that would supplement case-method 
training with explicit attention to legal history, legislation, 
and comparative law.8 
What then was the attraction of the Harvard model? 
Schlegel borrows some explanations from Robert Stevens’s 
classic history of legal education9 and Jerold Auerbach’s of 
the legal profession10: the drive to restrict entry to the 
profession to graduates of seven years of higher education 
was in part a class project to exclude lower orders and a 
nativist project to exclude Jews and the foreign-born 
generally from the profession. He borrows others from 
Magali Sarfatti Larson’s theory of professionalization11 as a 
market-control project dependent on “state sanction for 
exclusive possession of distinct knowledge based on 
university production of certified professionals.”12 The key 
move for professionalizers is to identify a field of operation 
distinct from anyone else’s and to standardize its content and 
 
CENTURY 103–06 (1978). 
 6. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Albert Shaw (Nov. 3, 1890), in THE PAPERS 
OF WOODROW WILSON, 1890-1892, 63 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969). 
 7. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: 
Have American Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and 
Responsibilities of the Present Day?, 14 HANDBOOK ASS’N AM. L. SCHS. 76 (1914).  
 8. John H. Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque 
Jurisprudentiae, 30 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1916-1917).  
 9. ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980s (1987). 
 10. JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA (1977). 
 11. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1979). 
 12. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American 
Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 320 (1985).  
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then control the market for purveyors of that content.13 Like 
other academic professions (studied by the intellectual 
historian Dorothy Ross)14:  
[A] small group of scholars created an academic discipline where 
none had been before. Each group began by staking out part of the 
intellectual world as its “turf,” adopting a particular way of looking 
at that turf, a method as it were, and moving to cut out the 
“amateurs” who formerly had a claim to that turf.15  
In Langdell’s case, the move was to identify the turf as “pure 
law,” the rules of private law doctrine to be found in appellate 
cases.16 Doctrinal analysis and argument is the thing we do 
that nobody else does. “Law = rules” as Schlegel sees it, is the 
gist of Langdell’s bequest, the “empty envelope” he left for 
future generations. 
The clearest illustration of the depth of the cultural equation of law 
with rule is the reaction of individuals fresh from our culture; take 
any group of middle class, first-year law students and try any 
approach other than a doctrinal, rule-focused one. They hate the 
alternatives because the alternatives undercut the notion of law as 
specialized knowledge available only to, and for sale by, the 
professional lawyer. That is the identity that they bring with them 
to law school, for that is what the culture tells them law is about. 
Legal education supports the notion of law as rule in the classroom 
and in the journals, in our bones as it were, just as it supports the 
notion that the prevailing rules are on the whole justified, a 
comforting notion for the bar as well as for the neophytes whom we 
train.17 
I recall learning the truth of this in a painful way when, as a 
still novice teacher I was invited to teach a large first-year 
class in Contracts at Harvard Law School. As a colleague, at 
the time, of Stewart Macaulay’s at Wisconsin, and imbued 
with the gospel of studying law in society, I began my course 
 
 13. Id. at 319–20. 
 14. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1990). 
 15. Schlegel, supra note 12, at 314. 
 16. Id. at 323. 
 17. John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy Or, the Case of the Empty 
Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (1984). 
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(as my own teacher Lon Fuller had done) with remedies, and 
led the students to see that the expectation measure of 
damages, reduced by mitigation, foreseeability, causation, 
and uncertainty limitations, and the unavailability of 
damages for non-economic harm or punitive sanctions unless 
one could prove an independent tort, all coupled with the 
American rule requiring parties to pay their own attorney’s 
fees, meant that most breaches of contract were simply not 
worth suing on. A substantial fraction of the class informed 
me that all this was not Law but rather Sociology of Law, 
which they had not come to Law School to learn. A real 
lawyer, on this view, would instruct his or her clients in the 
nuances of contract doctrine, without tactlessly and 
irrelevantly informing them they had no chance of recovering 
any money. I would bet that almost every law teacher has 
had an experience like this.18 More systematically, Elizabeth 
Mertz’s fascinating study of Contracts classes at eight 
different US law schools observes that law teachers keep any 
kind of non-doctrinal—e.g., social-contextual or explicitly 
policy-based or moral—matter safely at the margin, open to 
brief and casual impressionistic discussions rather than the 
subject of rigorous analysis.19 David Sandomierski of the 
University of Western Ontario Law School has just published 
a massive study of Canadian Contracts teachers.20 He shows 
that most of them (largely under the influence of graduate 
training in US law schools) have absorbed and internalized 
the basic insights of legal realism—that law is a product of 
its social context, that it reflects plural and often 
contradictory purposes and is riven by latent ideological 
conflict, and that communicating these insights is 
 
 18. It would be remiss of me not to add that I came to love this class, which 
remains one of the happiest teaching experiences of my career.  
 19. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” 211–12 (2007).  
 20. DAVID SANDOMIERSKI, ASPIRATION AND REALITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 178–
80 (2020). 
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indispensable to the practical training of future lawyers.21 
But, his book concludes, most of them do very little to 
operationalize these insights in their teaching, which is 
overwhelmingly, like that in the American classes reported 
by Mertz, doctrinal.22 Orthodoxy in perceptions of what is 
“practical” education seems to be silently enforced by 
students, as well as by general expectations of the 
profession—notwithstanding the nearly universal 
experience of graduates, once out of school, that their law 
school actually did very little to prepare them for practice.  
To sum up: Langdell’s legacy is impoverished because it 
gives a false idea of law. For Schlegel the legal realist, law is 
not a body of rules, but an array of practices. “It is 
institutions, actors of many kinds, and groups, a whole social 
manifold, and it is not just ideology, but actual resolution of 
conflicts, drama, and getting from yesterday to tomorrow in 
the bureaucratic state, as well.”23 The legacy is impoverished 
because the study of law as rules cuts them off from their 
social context, their political origins and consequences, their 
actual functioning. And in addition to not being sufficiently 
theoretical, or sufficiently grounded in history, social theory, 
and economic context, the study of law-as-rules is not very 
practical either. Analysis and argument over legal doctrine 
is one set of lawyers’ practical tasks, but only one and far 
from the most frequent. Compare, for example: investigating 
and arguing about facts; tweaking forms to fit particular 
transactional purposes; devising a legal structure around a 
business plan; case selection for strategic reasons; managing 
multi-party negotiations toward a commonly accepted 
outcome; engaging in regulatory arbitrage; trying to get a 
client into a drug rehab program to keep him out of prison; 
valuing a torts case; and steering a greedy or angry client 
 
 21. Id. at 286–90. 
 22. Id. 
 23. John Henry Schlegel, An Irrelevancy, Perhaps, 6 L. & POL’Y 307, 308 
(1984). 
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toward a realistic settlement, among a million others. If he 
had his way, clearly, Schlegel would aim for a curriculum 
somewhat closer to the Pomeroy model—a grounding in 
theory and history, followed by a series of exercises in 
practical tasks.  
To recapitulate: If law was to be a profession, it had to be 
attached to a university; if attached to a university, it had to 
have plausible academic content. The content Harvard chose 
to settle on was “pure law,” that is, private-law “science” in 
the arid mode of Austin’s jurisprudence, the exercise of 
grouping legal doctrines into categories of principles, and 
showing how they could be derived from those principles. The 
dominant alternative in Anglo-American tradition was a 
view of law that, instead of setting it apart from all the other 
social sciences in its own narrow realm, established it as the 
Queen of Social Sciences, integrating history, political 
economy, and moral theory into the ultimate purpose and 
end product toward which the scientific study of the social 
world was directed, the Science of Legislation. This was the 
science prefigured in Adam Smith’s Lectures on 
Jurisprudence and Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, taken up in Bentham’s codification projects and 
J.S. Mill’s tracts on Political Economy, and (not always with 
happy results!) applied to India through the codes of 
Macaulay, James Mill, and Fitzjames Stephen.24 Similarly, 
draft model legislation was announced to be the ultimate by-
product of studies conducted under the auspices of the 
American Social Science Association, the umbrella 
association for the new social sciences founded in 1865.25  
If these were the principal alternatives, you can see why 
the new universities springing up in the West and out of the 
land-grant colleges would pick the Langdell model. The 
Science of Legislation was political dynamite: heterodox 
 
 24. See ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA (1989). 
 25. On the ASSA, see THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1977).  
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professors like Henry Carter Adams, Edward Bemis, E.A. 
Ross, and Thorstein Veblen were fired at the instance of 
conservative trustees, and the president of the new American 
Economic Association, Richard T. Ely, nearly lost his job as 
well.26 (Harvard’s trustees actually did try to fire some Law 
School professors for their political opinions in the 1920s—
Zechariah Chafee for criticizing Red Scare prosecutions, 
Felix Frankfurter for questioning the fairness of Sacco and 
Vanzetti’s trial.)27 The strictly private-law focus of Harvard 
was much less obviously political. Moreover, Harvard 
seemed to show that a law school could admit and teach 
hundreds of students at a time, could rake in tuition money 
for the central university rather than depending on its 
subsidies, could attract young faculty out of practice without 
paying them all that much, and still enjoy great prestige.28 
Once the West Publishing Company saw money in 
publishing casebooks (an important part of the story Schlegel 
tells),29 Harvard’s case method of teaching was easily 
transplanted to new venues. Bright young lawyers could be 
recruited out of practice, could keep a few cases ahead of the 
students in the class while interrogating them mock-
Socratically, engaging them as equals before the same 
texts—and (also thanks to West) do research for their own 
 
 26. See MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE 
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–1905 (1975).  
 27. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL & DANIEL COQUILLETTE, THE INTELLECTUAL SWORD: 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, THE SECOND CENTURY 132–48 (2020). 
 28. A new book just off the presses on the history of Harvard Law School in 
the 20th century shows that the School’s financial model became the template, 
not just for other law schools, but for graduate professional education in the US 
generally. Id. at 195–218. Big differences opened up between the schools’ 
financial fortunes because law schools were at a relative disadvantage (until late 
in the 20th century) to raise significant amounts of money from sources other 
than tuitions. Id. at 787. Medical schools benefited from huge philanthropic 
benefactors, business schools from wealthy business donors. Lawyers were 
thought neither to need charity nor to be worthy objects of philanthropy. Harvard 
Law School itself was unable to raise any outside money until the Erwin Griswold 
era (1946-68), and only really succeeded at fundraising beginning with the 
deanship of Robert Clark (1989-2003). Id. at 800–02.  
 29. See Schlegel, supra note 12, at 318. 
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articles, casebooks and treatises without leaving the library. 
Teaching the Science of Legislation, on the other hand, would 
have required a faculty of polymaths like Pomeroy or 
Wigmore and probably needed miracles to engage the 
students. 
Now although change has been very slow and halting, I 
actually think there has been some movement in recent 
years away from the Langdellian model and somewhat more 
nearly approaching the Schlegelian in legal education. The 
improvement has mostly come on the academic side of 
contextual studies of law, rather than on the practical-
training side (though there is some movement in that 
direction too). The ideological content of law, formerly 
concealed under a screen of superficial “policy argument” and 
“interest balancing,” is now out in the open.30 Empirical 
studies in law-and-society and law-and-economics of the kind 
that Schlegel’s Realists tried out and mostly failed to follow 
through on, is also much more common and no longer such a 
despised and neglected poor relation in the law school 
faculties. Although it may once have been true that “law and” 
scholarship drawing on other disciplines imported only 
schlock versions of the other discipline, it is no longer true in 
every field, and certainly not in the field Schlegel and I both 
inhabit of legal history, where scholars appointed to law 
school faculties have won more than their share of history 
prizes in recent years.31  
Yet the expansion of interdisciplinary academic 
connections has provoked the inevitable backlash. Law 
 
 30. For this unmasking, credit is due to Chicago 1970s-style Law and 
Economics, which pretended to be a neutral positive science but was plainly 
anything but; to Critical Legal Studies and Feminist and Critical Race Theory; 
and not least to the Federalist Society, Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and Mitch 
McConnell among others who have not even tried to pretend that adjudication is 
a politically neutral enterprise.  
 31. The Bancroft Prize for the best book in American history has been 
awarded to legal scholars in 2016 (Mary Bilder), 2013 (John Fabian Witt), 2012 
(Tomiko Brown Nagin), 2011 (Christopher Tomlins), 2005 (Michael Klarman), 
and 1978 (Morton Horwitz).  
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offices want the schools to produce more “practice-ready” 
graduates to save them the cost of on-the-job training; and 
bar associations hope to make legal education more practical 
(sometimes by requiring more training in trial practice—
trial practice, mind you, in the age of the vanishing trial!) 
and, more usefully, to partner with practitioners to teach 
something about document drafting and transactional 
practice.  
Even more threatening: the appalling cost of seven years 
of higher education as a prerequisite to admission to the 
profession, now imposing student debt loads of half a million 
dollars or more, while even public law schools’ budgets are 
no longer subsidized, raises doubts about whether either the 
Langdellian model or the more academically and practically 
valuable—but also more labor-intensive—Schlegelian model 
can be sustained. All these problems will be made worse by 
the looming recession of the plague years.  
And as we all know, as the academic side of law teaching 
has swollen, so has our distance from the profession and the 
interests of most of our students, not always all that close to 
begin with. Schlegel has a lot to say about the 
phenomenology of the law teacher and of the students he or 
she tries to teach, and his meditations on their alienated 
condition are the most brilliant and penetrating I have seen 
anywhere.  
Schlegel isn’t just a grumpy old man complaining about 
“the youth of today” and their hippity-hop music and 
annoying habit of treading on his lawn. He understands and 
sympathizes with their alienation, up to a point. He knows 
the reasons for it are the insecurity of employment in the 
legal market and the terrible burden of debt and the fear that 
taking risks might mess up one’s resume or GPA.  
They did not create the world in which they find themselves and it 
is highly doubtful that they would have chosen it had they been 
given a choice. It is ugly to find oneself in a world where social 
advance, or even maintenance of social position, requires twenty 
years of an education that is not intrinsically attractive leading to 
not very secure employment opportunities doing work that is not all 
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that interesting.32 
But he is grieved to observe the deadly effects of such 
conditions on the will to learn.  
[A]t times, it seems that almost everything other than the thinnest, 
narrowest, most quickly comprehended material, delivered much as 
the classic heroin addict’s plea, “straight in the arm,” is an 
imposition on the life of the law student, a life conceived as moving 
on, getting this over with, as an endless series of occasions to hit the 
“page down” button on the computer program that is learning. 
Maybe even on the computer program that is life.33 
Thus the demand for the doctrinal curriculum, for law as 
rules. To give Langdell credit, what he promoted, and 
apparently himself brought to the classroom, was lively 
disputation about rules.34 What many students prefer, 
however, is simple exposition of the rules, in the manner of 
the well-taught bar review cram course. This is perfectly 
good instruction for the purpose of passing the bar exam. But 
it has little or no value as preparation for the practice of 
law—for what Schlegel calls “keeping the job,” rather than 
“getting the job.” Good lawyering—unfortunately less and 
less common in an age where much practice is bureaucratic 
routine—is a craft skill, and one that calls for the exercise of 
judgment.  
The subject of judgment can be various: a merger, a regulatory 
filing, a financing package, a property settlement, a plea 
agreement, a complaint, a brief, a trial strategy, the structure of a 
financial instrument, or a business plan. All require judgment, a 
matter of more or less, a matter of taking ownership of a problem 
and so accepting responsibility for the quality of the solution 
proffered, rather than merely deferring to “the law.” More crudely 
put, it is the act of putting one’s butt on the line. A lawyer who 
 
 32. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a 
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 469 (2018).  
 33. Id. at 443.  
 34. Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, 
Which They Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in 
the Classrooms of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 57 
(1999). Schlegel comments on this article in Langdell’s Auto-da-Fe, 17 L. & HIST. 
REV. 149 (1999). 
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exercises judgment accepts the risk that the advice given will be 
less than optimum, even wrong, and so accepts the blame that 
follows from poor judgment. Thus, for the exercise of judgment—as 
distinguished from “just” filing routine papers—a lawyer is entitled 
to be paid well, even when no question of malpractice could possibly 
arise.35 
If anyone has said this better, I don’t know who it is.  
How does Schlegel himself handle the challenge of 
teaching in an alienated and bureaucratic age? The model he 
offers is not one he expects anyone else to follow. Its 
exemplar is Don Fabrizio Corbèra, the eponymous 
aristocratic hero of Lampedusa’s Leopard, in his own eyes a 
walking anachronism.  
I teach as if law were a species of handicraft, and for those who 
might possibly so understand it. The trick then—Don Fabrizio’s 
trick—is at the same time to harbor no illusions about what is being 
learned, as well as no regrets that other things are not being 
learned. Teach for the handcrafters, those who are willing, however 
hesitantly, to take the risk of exercising judgment, but grade for the 
credentialists, since the handcrafters will need the credential too.36 
I would bet that more students than Schlegel gives himself 
credit for, who have been exposed to his steadfast cranky 
integrity, have recognized that they have brushed against 
greatness. 
 
 35. Schlegel, supra note 32, at 463–64.  
 36. Id. at 477–78.  
